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Abstract 
The “return of the state” as an economic actor has left scholars at a lack of theoretical tools to 
capture the characteristics of state-dominated business systems. This is reflected in the fact that 
any type of state intervention in the economy is too easily qualified as a sign of “authoritarian 
capitalism,” which has led scholars to lump together countries as diverse as China, Singapore, 
and Norway under that heading. Rather than considering any type of state intervention in the 
economy as authoritarian, we propose a more sophisticated conceptualization, which 
distinguishes two boundaries between the public and the private domains and conceives of the 
“return of the state” as the erosion of one or both of them. This conceptualization allows us to 
clearly distinguish a shift from an ideal-typical market-based “regulatory capitalism” to “state 
capitalism” or “authoritarian capitalism” respectively. We use interview data with business 
leaders in an extreme case of the return of the state to identify the nature of the mechanisms by 
which an authoritarian government erodes these public-private divides. We argue that a focus 
on these constitutive mechanisms of the erosion of public- private divides allows us to define 
“authoritarian capitalism” in a way that makes it a useful tool to understand contexts beyond 
the Chinese case in which it first emerged.   
JEL Codes: P16, P26, H13 
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What is authoritarian capitalism? How is it different from state capitalism? Current 
management scholarship does not allow us to answer these questions, because studies of the 
“return of the state” as economic actor mostly focus on its ownership function and label any 
economic systems “state-capitalist” where the state holds significant ownership stakes in 
commercial businesses (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014; Dolfsma 
& Grosman, 2019; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2016; Musacchio, 
Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015). Similarly, attempts to understand the “return of the state” as the 
emergence of a new type of capitalism as part of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
categorization (Hall & Soskice, 2001) have remained somewhat unconvincing (e.g. Hofman, 
Moon, & Wu, 2017; Situ, Tilt, & Seet, 2018), because the VoC perspective exclusively focuses 
on the role of the state as a regulator – and hence a ‘background factor’ – not as an active 
economic player (Schmidt, 2009: 519-20). Even attempts to remedy this shortcoming by 
applying typologies of states drawn from the national governance and business systems 
literatures (Evans, 1995; Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997; Whitley, 2007) have focused on rather 
broad-brush typologies – usually distinguishing regulatory-, welfare-, developmental-, and 
predatory states (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018; Witt et al., 2017).  
These categories, however, are not sufficient to capture the complexities of modern 
forms of state-dominated economies and leave researchers at a lack of conceptual tools to 
understand current changes in the economic role of the state. This is illustrated by the recent 
tendency to apply the arguably crude label “authoritarian capitalism” to any economy with a 
more interventionist state than the Western ideal of the “regulatory state” (Majone, 1994) 
including countries like Norway (Situ et al., 2018: 9). Conversely, other authors define 
“authoritarian capitalism” largely based on the empirical reality of China (Witt & Redding, 
2014; Hofman et al., 2017), which leads to a risk of tautology. 
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Defining more clearly what is authoritarian about authoritarian capitalism, we aim to 
turn the concept of “authoritarian capitalism” into a useful analytical tool beyond the Chinese 
case and distinct from “state capitalism.” Few, if any, papers using the concept “authoritarian 
capitalism” define what “authoritarian” means. In this article, we define it broadly as state 
intervention that denies certain individual’s fundamental political and economic rights. It thus 
constitutes a transgression of the principle of self-limitation of government power implied by 
the norm of Rule of Law (RoL) (Chen & Deakin, 2015). 
As such, we argue that authoritarian capitalism is the result of constant renegotiation 
and redefinition of the boundary between the public and the private domains not just in the 
political, but also the economic realm. Yet, we know very little about the mechanisms 
contemporary authoritarian governments use to subject economic actors to state control and 
thus redefine what is public and what private. We therefore seek to explore the question what 
mechanisms do authoritarian governments use to erode the frontier between the public and the 
private domains in the economic realm? 
We claim that it is key to go beyond classifying systems as “authoritarian” simply based 
on the type of “tools” the state uses to intervene – such as regulation, incentives, and ownership 
(Situ et al., 2018). Rather, we propose that what allows us to define “authoritarian capitalism” 
– and to distinguish it from “state capitalism” and “regulatory capitalism” – is the way in which 
these tools are used (in accordance with principles of the RoL or against them) and to what 
purpose (in pursuit of the public good or elite interests). We show that the tools of state 
intervention should be considered mechanisms that play a constitutive role in creating the 
authoritarian capitalist system they are part of (cf. Bunge, 2004).  
Our qualitative study is based on semi-structured interviews in the context of Hungary 
under the Orbán government. Hungary is an “extreme case” due to the speed at and the extent 
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to which the rise of authoritarian capitalism happened. It therefore allows us to explore more 
clearly the mechanisms underlying the rise of authoritarian capitalism. 
Our study makes three contributions. First, it further nuances the typology of states used 
in the literature on emerging varieties of capitalism (Fainshmidt et al., 2018; Witt et al., 2017). 
Second, we respond to recent calls for research that “document[s] the changing role of states 
and governments” to better understand the impact of “authoritarian and non-democratic 
tendencies” on firms (Kourula et al. 2019: 2, 16). We identify the transformative mechanisms 
that allowed the Orbán government to shift the boundaries between the public and the private 
domains. Acknowledging that these often neglected means of political control over the 
economy are constitutive of authoritarian capitalism, allows us to provide a more precise, 
empirically grounded definition of authoritarian capitalism. Thirdly, our study allows us to turn 
an either empty concept (that lacks a definition of authoritarianism) or an essentially 
tautological one (that identifies authoritarian capitalism with China) into a more robust, multi-
dimensional concept that helps us understand state-dominated economies.   
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Theoretical Background 
The “Return of the State”  
The ongoing “global shift” in the world economy from “West” to “East” (Dicken, 2015) and 
the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007 have led to a remarkable change in both the 
discourse and realities of state intervention in the economy (Bremmer, 2008; Kourula, Moon, 
Salles-Djelic, & Wickert, 2019; Kurlantzick, 2016; Musacchio, 2008). The increasing 
importance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as players in the world economy is but one 
conspicuous sign of this shift (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra et 
al., 2014). This “return of the state” came at a time, when most scholars had gotten used to 
analyzing the role of the political in the economy as a “retreat of the state” (Strange, 1996). 
Since the arrival of Thatcherism/Reaganomics in the 1980s, the focus had been on analyzing 
firms as increasingly important actors in providing public goods and services that states were 
no longer able or willing to provide on their own (Kourula et al., 2019; Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011; Schneider & Scherer, 2019). The end of Soviet communism reinforced this trend, 
meaning that little scholarship focused on analyzing the state as an economic actor (Schmidt, 
2009). Rather, the focus was on the “economization of the political” (Gond et al., 2011: 662). 
Yet, the return of the state constitutes – to paraphrase Gond et al. (2011) – a “re-politicization 
of the economic” and hence a reversal of the shift of the public-private boundary. While 
theories about the regulatory and post-regulatory states have been developed in reaction to the 
above trends of the retreat of the state (Kourola et al., 2019: 16), we lack sophisticated 
theoretical and conceptual tools to understand the return of the state. This has led to a great 
deal of conceptual unclarity and confusion about what types of states we see emerging in 
different parts of the world. Importantly, authoritarian and non-democratic types of states are 
often lumped together with other, more benign forms of state control over the economy under 
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the heading of “authoritarian-” or “state capitalism” (Witt & Redding, 2014; Situ et al., 2018; 
Hofman et al., 2017). 
 
Three different attempts at understanding state-permeated (Nölke et al., 2015) or state-
dominated (Lane, 2008) economies – especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
– can be identified in the recent literature. Firstly, management scholars have started to theorize 
the return of the state as an owner of business enterprises (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Dolfsma 
& Grosman, 2019; Inoue et al., 2013; Musacchio et al., 2015). Here, any economic system 
where the state owns significant stakes in companies – either as complete-, majority-, or 
minority shareholder (Musacchio et al., 2015) – qualifies as “state capitalism” (Kurlantzick, 
2016). While important, the narrow focus on the state’s ownership function leads scholars to 
omit many tools – other than ownership of firms – that interventionist governments can use to 
control economic actors (Dolfsma & Grosman, 2019; Situ et al., 2018). 
A second approach has attempted to capture the specificities of state-dominated 
economies by applying the VoC approach to LMICs (Dentchev, Haezendonck, & van Balen, 
2017; Hofman et al., 2017; Witt & Redding, 2014). This approach is useful, because it allows 
us to systematically compare little-known economies to well-studied high-income ones. Yet, a 
major weakness of the VoC approach consist in its focus on regulatory institutions and its lack 
of any theory of the state (e.g. Schmidt, 2009). 
A third approach remedies the shortcoming of VoC approaches by borrowing a 
typology of states from the national business- or governance systems (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 
1997; Whitley, 2007) and developmental studies literatures (Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; 
Evans, 1995). This stream of research distinguishes four types of states: “regulatory-,” 
“welfare-,” “developmental-,” and “predatory states” (Fainshmidt et al., 2018; Witt et al., 
2017). The two latter categories in particular are potentially useful to understand the return of 
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the state in LMICs. The “predatory” type is “governed by elites who monopolize power […] 
so as to generate profits that benefit them rather than society at large” (Carney & Witt, 2012: 
12). As such, it is distinct from the “developmental state,” where “a government ministry can 
have the freedom to plan the economy and look to long-term national interests without having 
its economic policies disrupted by either corporate-class or working-class short-term or narrow 
interests” (Carney & Witt, 2012: 12). 
Intriguingly, however, this useful typology is not leveraged to clarify the concepts of 
“state-“and “authoritarian capitalism.” Thus, Witt and Redding (2014: 15) characterize China’s 
authoritarian capitalism as “a developmental state with distinct predatory admixtures;” without 
further explaining how the concepts of authoritarianism, developmental- and predatory state 
relate to each other. For Situ et al. (2018) authoritarian capitalism is a “form of state capitalism” 
(p. 6), which is distinguished from other forms by the fact that the state “uses newer, more 
sophisticated tools [than state ownership] to manage both state-owned and non–state-owned 
companies” (p. 1), namely incentives and regulative influence. However, it is not obvious why 
these three mechanisms – ownership, regulation, incentives – should be substantively qualified 
as “authoritarian” in the common sense of the term and how they differ from mechanisms 
commonly used in (state) capitalist – but not authoritarian – countries (Musacchio et al., 2015; 
Kurlantzick 2016; Dolfsma & Grosman, 2019). Indeed, Situ et al. (2018: 9) suggest that 
because “SOEs play an instrumental role in society” even Norway qualifies as authoritarian 
capitalism just like China or Singapore. Yet, is authoritarian capitalism a useful description of 
the Norwegian economy? We think not. 
In the next section, we argue that more clearly defining authoritarian capitalism implies 
answering two questions: What distinguishes (regulatory) capitalism from state capitalism? 
Secondly, what makes state capitalism authoritarian? To answer these questions, we require a 
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standard by which to judge the extent, quality, and purpose of state control over the economy. 
We argue that the concept of the Rule of Law allows us to do that. 
What Distinguishes Regulatory Capitalism from State Capitalism? The Rule of Law and the 
two boundaries between the private and the public 
The RoL has many definitions (Ohnesorge, 2007). Fundamentally, it can be defined as 
a norm of equality before the law and the separation of the judiciary from other branches of 
government. This twin principle of equality and autonomy applies not just to the judiciary, but 
to state officials in general. Thus, equality before the law also requires that the state and its 
agents subject themselves to the law like any ordinary citizen. As such, it contains a principle 
of self-limitation whereby the state “acknowledges limits to its own knowledge, capacities and 
powers” (Chen & Deakin, 2015: 124). The principle of autonomy, in turn, implies the 
independence not just of judges, but of the state and its agents from “the influence of personal 
gain and partisan or popular bias” (Jones 1958 quoted in Ohnesorge, 2007: 101-2).  
Thus defined, the RoL establishes two boundaries between the private and the public 
domains: the first one between the state and the private sphere – including in the economy – 
(self-limitation); the second one between the state apparatus and particularistic interests of the 
governing elite (state autonomy). Redefining the boundary between public and private, 
constitutes shifts along these two dimensions. 
Regarding the second boundary, it is important to note, that “particularistic elite 
interests” should not be equated with personal gain alone. Personal gain is one of many ways 
in which the governing elite may define its particularistic interests. Other definitions may relate 
to “partisan bias” rather than personal gain; including collective interests such as the 
maintenance of power by one party (e.g. in the case of China; McGregor, 2012). Even broader 
definitions include collective interests (e.g. the national interest). However, contrary to cases 
where a genuine pursuit of the public good is guiding state action, the above-mentioned 
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criterion of “partisan or popular bias,” implies that the collective interest is defined exclusively 
in two senses: It often excludes certain minority groups (immigrants, ethnical minorities – e.g. 
welfare for nationals only); and it claims exclusivity over the definition of the legitimate 
collective state goal; eliminating pluralism and competition of ideas (Müller, 2017). 
This definition allows us to answer the question what distinguishes regulatory 
capitalism from state capitalism (see table 1). Regulatory capitalism is based on an extensive 
interpretation of the principle of self-limitation of the state. Drawing on the classical liberal 
definition of the RoL as the protection of the private sphere from undue state interference, 
legitimate state law is restrictively defined as legal rules proscribing behaviors that infringe on 
other people’s liberties; excluding more interventionist rules that prescribe certain state-wanted 
behaviors (Hayek, 1960). This limitative definition of the role of the state as protecting private 
actors’ rights to pursue their private goals provides a normative basis for the “regulatory state” 
concept (cf. Majone, 1994), which, in turn, is closely associated with the neo-liberal ideal of a 
state that “steers but doesn’t row” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). It contains an often implicit 
normative statement that the state should not expand its control over the economy beyond the 
principle of “subsidiarity,” whereby the state only intervenes to correct “market failures” and 
“negative externalities” (Aßländer & Curbach, 2017). This ideal-type of a minimal regulatory 
state is often what authors have in mind when opposing capitalism without qualifier to state 
capitalism. We call it ‘regulatory capitalism’ to clearly underscore that unqualified capitalism 
too requires a state to support it.1 
 
1 Indeed, the term “state capitalism” is potentially misleading in the sense that it suggests that there can be 
capitalism without a state. We reject this latter view, which ignores the constitutive role of the state in the 
emergence of capitalism (Deakin, Gindis, Hodgson, Huang, & Pistor, 2017). We still use the term “state 
capitalism,” because it has become an established term in the literature. 
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From this perspective, the “return of the state” can be understood as a shift of the first 
private-public boundary where the state expands its role in the economy beyond the self-
limiting principle of subsidiarity. This shift takes place through mechanisms such as the re-
nationalization of firms and other forms of state involvement in firm ownership (Bremmer, 
2008; Dolfsma & Grosman, 2019; Inoue et al., 2013; Kurlantzick, 2016), or through re-
regulation (see table 1, column 6 ). 
However, while this shift can be interpreted as the emergence of “state-permeated” 
types of capitalism (Nölke et al., 2015), it does not necessarily lead to “authoritarian 
capitalism.” To justify the qualifier “authoritarian,” and hence to be able to answer the question 
about the distinction between state- and authoritarian capitalism, we need consider two 
additional factors: firstly, the way in which the shift of the first boundary between public and 
private takes place; secondly, the purpose of the shift and hence of the increased state control 
over the economy, which, in turn, relates to a shift in the second private-public boundary (state 
autonomy). 
We need to start with a more precise definition of authoritarianism. Most studies of 
“authoritarian capitalism” do not provide any definition of the terms “authoritarian” or 
“authoritarianism.” Often, they simply equate the empirical features of the Chinese model of 
capitalism with the definition of authoritarian capitalism (Witt & Redding, 2014; Hofman et 
al., 2017; Situ et al., 2018). Unsurprisingly, this leads authors to consider authoritarian 
capitalism as a model sui generis (e.g. Situ et al. 2018: 7). 
“Authoritarianism” usually refers to a political system, which is opposed to liberal 
democracy in the sense that it restricts citizens’ rights to participate in politics and to publicly 
contest power (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). While this clearly defines authoritarianism 
in the political sphere, it is less clear what “authoritarian” means when applied to the economic 
sphere as the notion “authoritarian capitalism” suggests. Here a more fundamental definition 
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is useful. Substantively, “authoritarianism” is opposed “to the ‘liberal’ values of tolerance of 
ambiguity and difference” in that it insists on “obedience to rules, […] on conformity, and use 
of coercion and punishment to ensure that obedience” while disregarding “human freedom and 
dignity” (Henderson, 1991: 382). This substantive definition captures two aspects of 
authoritarianism; one procedural (disregard for individual rights and dignity); one in terms of 
outcomes (elimination of plurality). This suggests that not all state intervention in the economy 
can be qualified as “authoritarian.” Increasing state intervention in the economy shifts the first 
private-public boundary in favor of the public domain. While this can be qualified as a move 
towards “state capitalism,” the conclusion that it leads to “authoritarian capitalism” would only 
be warranted if the way in which the state increases its control over the economy violated 
fundamental principles of individual rights and dignity. Only an extreme libertarian 
interpretation of individual rights and liberties would lead us to qualify interventions that are 
lawful and limited to incentivizing, regulating, or exercising the state’s legal ownership as 
“authoritarian” (e.g. Situ et al. 2018). 
Thus, the shift from regulatory capitalism to both state capitalism and to authoritarian 
capitalism can happen through re-regulation (Schneider & Scherer, 2019) or (re-) 
nationalization of companies through state investment in firms (Inoue et al., 2013; Dolfsma & 
Grosman, 2019) (table 1, col. 7). Yet, the key difference is that in state capitalism the RoL is 
respected, while in authoritarian capitalism it is not. Thus, re-nationalizations that follow 
certain procedural standards, imply a compensation for the owner of the asset should be 
distinguished from outright expropriation (Berrios, Marak, & Morgenstern, 2011; Kobrin, 
1984) or from nationalizations that are followed by subsequent re-privatizations. Similarly, re-
regulating a given area of the economy – while limiting private actors leeway - does not 
obviously violate the RoL and cannot per se be seen as part of an authoritarian trend. 
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Conversely, it is important to note that the violation of the RoL does not necessarily 
imply illegality in the sense of violating the positive “laws of the land.” Indeed, authoritarian 
regimes can use law very effectively to pursue their oppressive goals (Rajah, 2012). Here the 
principle of self-limitation of government power provides an important additional test (column 
5, table 1). Rejecting self-limitation, the ruling elite in authoritarian regimes only accepts the 
law as long as they control its content and as far as it can be used instrumentally to favor the 
elite’s interests and goals (Müller, 2017). Beyond that, they do not subject themselves to the 
RoL and do not respect the “checks and balances” that were put in place to guarantee it. 
Institutional reforms to subject the judiciary power to the executive power of the government 
are indeed a hallmark of contemporary authoritarian regimes (Müller, 2017). These 
mechanisms of “democratic backsliding” are associated with authoritarian – but not state- – 
capitalism and have their equivalent in the economic sphere (table 1, column 6). Thus, the 
literature on authoritarian politics has identified the centralization of the state apparatus 
(Greskovits, 2015) and the reduction of political pluralism through the authoritarian use of 
legislative and constitutional change as key strategies of authoritarian governments to 
concentrate power in the elite’s hands (e.g. Müller, 2017: 44).  
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The second criteria to distinguish authoritarian capitalism from state capitalism is the 
purpose of the state’s increasing control over the economy. The “developmental state” 
literature (Johnson 1982; Evans 1995) has described systems where the state intervenes 
extensively in the economy beyond the protection of private individuals, but does so in pursuit 
of collective goals; such as the “public good” or the “national interest” (see table 1, column 4). 
Here, private market participants’ freedom to pursue their private interests are not an absolute 
boundary to state intervention, but state intervention in the economy is still self-limited by 
some notion of “public good” (see column 5, table 1). Such a system where the state’s role 
goes beyond “subsidiarity”, but still accepts the principle of self-limitation – albeit a more 
limited one –, can be termed “state capitalism” (cf. table 1; row 2). 
However, the developmental state literature generally acknowledges that for this active 
role to translate into benign outcomes, the state apparatus needs to be protected from “state 
 
1st private-public 
boundary: State 
intervention in the economy 
2nd private-public 
boundary: State 
autonomy from private 
interests 
Main tools of 
state action 
Purpose of state action Self-limiting principle of 
state action 
Processes and mechanisms of transition 
R
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y 
C
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ita
lis
m
 
Principle of subsidiarity – 
state as regulator not actor 
(“steering not rowing”) 
State captured by self-
seeking bureaucrats and 
politicians (public 
choice) – State 
autonomy must be 
protected from self-
seeking insiders 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 
1962) 
Regulation and 
incentives 
(Majone 1996) 
Governance of business 
conduct to secure 
economic transactions 
and avoid harm 
(Hayek 1960) 
Private good constitutes a 
normative goal and at the 
same time a limit to state 
action. 
 
Nationalisations (with compensation) (Kobrin, 1984) 
Reregulation (Schneider & Scherer, 2019) 
 
 
 
St
at
e 
ca
pi
ta
lis
m
 Expansion of “political 
realm” into “economic 
realm” beyond “subsidiarity 
principle”. State becomes 
economic actor (“steering 
and rowing”). 
State must be 
autonomous from 
particularistic private 
interest groups – State 
must be protected from 
capture by outsiders 
(Evans, 1995). 
Various, 
including board 
seats, state 
ownership, 
political ties 
(Dolfsma & 
Grosman, 2018; 
Grosman et al. 
2016) 
Governance of business 
conduct to avoid harm 
and achieve (public) 
political, economic, and 
societal goals 
(Evans, 1995) 
Public good constitutes a 
normative goal and at the 
same time a limit to state 
action. 
 
Nationalisations (without compensation) (Kobrin, 
1984) and reprivatisation to governing elite 
Authoritarian Reregulation (violating the RoL) 
(Rajah, 2012) 
Centralisation (Greskovits, 2015)  
Reduction of pluralism (Muller, 2017) 
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Expansion of “political 
realm” into “economic 
realm” beyond regulatory 
state’s “subsidiarity 
principle”. State becomes 
economic actor (“steering 
and rowing”). 
Colonization of state 
apparatus by elite. State 
interest are identified 
with either elite’s private 
(Wedel, 2003) or 
collective interests; or 
with an exclusionary 
definition of national 
interest. 
Various, 
including board 
seats, state 
ownership, 
political ties 
(Dolfsma & 
Grosman, 2018; 
Grosman et al. 
2016) 
Private political and 
economic goals – public 
good as ‘by-product’ or 
for ‘legitimization’ 
(Kang, 2002) 
Unlimited state: Neither 
public- nor private good 
constitute a limit to state 
action. 
Table 1: Regulatory-, State- and Authoritarian Capitalism 
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capture” by particularistic interest groups (Evans, 1995). This corresponds with the second 
private-public boundary that is upheld by the respect of the RoL. 
An external threat to the second private-public divide stems from authoritarian elite 
groups that pursue anti-pluralist political programs. Authoritarianism implies a disregard for 
plurality and a belief that only the governing elite – once in power – can deliver the promised 
goals (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Authoritarian parties will seek to capture the state apparatus 
and use it to pursue the elite’s particularistic interests while attempting to eliminate any 
alternative definitions of the legitimate goal of the state (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; 
Müller, 2017). It is this “colonization” of the state, the monopoly of the governing elite to 
define the “public good”, which hence becomes identified with the elite’s interest, and the 
instrumental use of the state to pursue this goal that further distinguishes authoritarian 
capitalism from state capitalism. Although rent extraction is not the sole purpose of state 
capture, it does make rent extraction easier and will hence increase the likelihood of it 
happening. 
The importance of the second private-public boundary and the risk of “state capture” 
are acknowledged by theories informing the regulatory state idea as well. Yet, from the 
regulatory state perspective, the threat of state capture is internal not external and individual 
not collective. Indeed, informed by public choice theory, politicians and civil servants 
themselves are seen as self-seeking utility maximisers who – once in control – will use the state 
apparatus to serve their personal interests (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Pennington, 2010) (see 
table 1, column 2). The only way to maintain the second private-public divide is to keep the 
state bureaucracy to a minimum to limit opportunities for the state’s power to be used for 
private enrichment rather than as guarantor of the decentralized market order (Gamble, 2016).  
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In sum, our conceptualization of “authoritarian capitalism” suggests that it is distinct 
from “regulatory capitalism” regarding the extent of state intervention determined by the first 
private-public boundary; and from both “regulatory-“ and “state capitalism” in that the erosion 
of the first boundary happens in an authoritarian way and the purpose of the erosion is to 
promote the narrow and exclusive (collective or private) interest of the governing elite, which 
implies the erosion of the second boundary. 
 
A dynamic view of state capitalisms 
Our conceptualization of different types of state capitalisms according to the two 
boundaries between the private and the public realms corresponds with what Gamble (2016: 
493) has called “an evolutionary view of the state, in which the dividing lines between what is 
public and what is private, and how the two interact, are matters of continual political conflict 
and debate.” Given that the return of the state and the authoritarian and non-democratic 
processes that accompany it are dynamic trends, our study investigates the processes by which 
a country moves from one of these ideal-typical categories to the other. As such, we contribute 
to the understudied question of “the ways in which this return [of the state] is in fact taking 
place” (Kourola et al. 2019: 8). Indeed, we know very little about the mechanisms that allow 
governments to shift the two boundaries between the public and the private and how this alters 
state-business relationships. 
Contrary to Situ et al.’s (2018) definition, “tools” of state intervention such as owning, 
regulating, and incentivizing per se are not sufficient to define authoritarian capitalism. Rather, 
it is the ways in which they are used and the ends to which they are used that turn them from 
tools of state capitalism into instruments of authoritarian capitalism. We follow recent studies 
that focus on the “social mechanisms” by which governments expand their role in the economy 
(Schneider & Scherer, 2019). Such “social mechanism” can be defined as “one of the processes 
17 
 
in a concrete system that makes it what it is” (Bunge, 2004 :182; also Hedstrom & Ylikoski, 
2010). As such, it is the mechanisms not the tools that – in a constitutive way – make 
“authoritarian capitalism” what it is. 
Based on these definitions, our empirical study investigates the ways in which these 
mechanisms are used to create authoritarian capitalism in the case of the Hungarian government 
of Viktor Orbán. We thus reply to calls that understanding the return of the state requires “a 
contextualized understanding of government influence” (Kourola et al., 2019: 16). 
 
Data and Method 
The case context 
The context of post-socialist economies in East Central Europe (ECE) – i.e. Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic – constitutes an ideal setting to study the mechanisms by 
which an authoritarian government extends the political domain into the economic one in the 
interest of the ruling elite. For more than a decade after the fall of communism, these countries 
were amongst the most advanced in their transition towards a Western-style capitalism, even 
if they benefited relatively less from European integration than their western counterparts 
(Pelle et al., 2019). Yet, in the past decade all ECE countries experienced a dramatic change in 
direction in their transition, away from the Western ideal of a liberal-democratic market 
economy towards a more state-dominated and less democratic model (Greskovits, 2015; 
Sedelmeier, 2014). 
In Hungary, since the 2010 elections, the conservative coalition of Fidesz and its junior 
electoral partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), have held more than two-
thirds of the seats in the parliament (Kovács, 2015). The general elections of 2014 and 2018 
have confirmed Fidesz’s dominant position in the country’s political system (Greskovits, 2015; 
Kovács, 2015). In 2018, Fidesz obtained more than 49 percent of the vote, with some 2.6 
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million voting for Fidesz. This provided the party with a two-thirds majority in parliament and 
hence a free hand to pursue in-depth legal and constitutional changes (Santora and Bienvenu, 
2018). 
Using its supermajority in parliament, the government has systematically engaged in 
actions that undermined democratic institutions (Greskovits, 2015; Kovács, 2015; Sallai, 
2014), curbed judicial independence, and clamped down on the independent media (Tait, 
2016). These well-documented actions by the Hungarian government have been interpreted by 
scholars as signs of “democratic backsliding” (Ekiert, 2012; Sedelmeier, 2014; Bandelj et al., 
2015; Greskovits, 2015) or a “democratic U-turn” (Kornai, 2015). 
 
Democratic backsliding 
“Backsliding” is defined as “destabilization or even a reversal in the direction of 
democratic development” and “is usually traced to the radicalization of sizeable groups within 
the remaining active citizenry, and the weakening loyalty of political elites to democratic 
principles” (Greskovits, 2015: 28). More concretely, “democratic backsliding” in Hungary and 
elsewhere involved various simultaneous processes including “softening up the legal and 
procedural constraints of legislation and government; far reaching centralization within the 
units of public administration; increasing exposure of civil servants to political pressures; 
stripping the parliamentary opposition off its remaining opportunities to influence political 
decisions; serious restrictions of media freedom; and the repeated modification of the electoral 
law in favor of the incumbent” (Greskovits, 2015: 34). 
Yet, backsliding has not just affected the political-, but also the economic sphere, 
bringing these countries closer to a model of “authoritarian capitalism.” Indeed, while the first 
phase of transition after the end of socialism has led to the emergence of private business sector 
through privatizations and the establishment of new firms (Martin, 2002), we have recently 
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seen a return of the state as an economic actor in its own right. Our empirical analysis attempts 
to investigate the nature of the mechanisms used by the government in the process that leads 
to authoritarian capitalism. 
 
Research design 
In order to explore the emergence of “authoritarian capitalism” we focused on Hungary 
as a single country case. We selected Hungary as a critical- or revelatory case, because it is 
arguably one of the most extreme examples of “backsliding”. Member of the European Union 
and after the fall of the Iron Curtain one of the most advanced economies, today Hungary is 
essentially controlled by a single party (Sedelmeier, 2014; Greskovits, 2015) and constitutes 
an extreme case of ‘strong man politics’ (Lendvai, 2017). Extreme cases help us explore 
patterns that may not be easily recognizable in an average-, or typical case (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008).  
 
Data and analysis 
Our empirical analysis is based on 60 semi-structured interviews conducted between 
2009 and 2017 (See Table 2). We chose to carry out semi-structured in-depth interviews, 
because they constitute an insightful method for exploring the “often nuanced causal factors of 
specific managerial action” (Lawton et al., 2013: 231).  
Regarding our sampling strategy, given the sensitive nature of the research topic we 
relied on personal contacts to secure the interviews. After having obtained a first set of 
interviews, we used a ‘snow-ball’ sampling approach based on our interviewees’ 
recommendations and introductions. We targeted foreign and domestic firms in Hungary, 
because we aimed to constitute a sample comprised of all categories of companies commonly 
distinguished in the post-socialism literature, namely privatized incumbent firms, foreign new 
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entrants, and domestic new entrants (e.g. Martin, 2008). We used categorical sampling by 
selecting participants from a wide variety of sectors and types of companies (see table 2).  
Informant's sector 
Type of interviewee 
(number of 
interviews) 
Year of interviews 
(number of interviews 
in that year) 
Number 
of Total 
interviews 
in the 
sector 
Banking 
CEO (4), Vice-CEO 
(2) 2012 (4), 2016 (2) 6 
Construction 
Chair (2), Director (2), 
CEO (1) 
2011 (3), 2012 (1), 2016 
(1) 5 
Energy CEO (1), Director (5) 
2011 (4), 2013 (1), 2015 
(1) 6 
ICT CEO (4), Director (5) 
2009 (2), 2011 (3), 2012 
(1), 2016 (1), 2017 (2) 9 
Manufacturing 
CEO (5), Vice-CEO 
(1), Director (2) 
2009 (1), 2011 (2), 2012 
(1), 2015 (1), 2016 (2), 
2017 (1) 8 
Telecommunication 
CEO (1), Vice-CEO 
(1) 2015 (1), 2016 (1) 2 
Retail Director (4) 
2011 (1), 2012 (1), 2016 
(2) 4 
Wholesale CEO (2) 2012 (1), 2017 (1) 2 
All other sectors: 
tobacco, tourism, 
consulting, 
advertising, 
beverages CEO (1), Director (4) 
2009 (1), 2012 (1), 2013 
(1), 2016 (1), 2017 (1) 5 
NGOs  
Secretary General (4), 
Director (7) 
2011 (4), 2012 (2), 2016 
(2), 2017 (3) 11 
Other 
Political advisor (1), 
Journalist (1) 2011(1), 2017 (1) 2 
Total number of 
interviews   
2009 (4), 2011 (18), 2012 
(12), 2013 (2), 2015 (3), 
2016 (12), 2017 (9) 60 
Table 2: Respondents by Sector 
The final sample included 22 interviews with top managers (CEOs, vice-CEOs, board 
members, heads of business units) of Hungarian firms, 25 interviews with CEOs and Public 
Affairs directors of local subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs) and 13 interviews 
with experts from the context of the case (representatives of associations, chambers of 
commerce, trade unions, NGOs etc.). Among the multinational subsidiaries we had companies 
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with headquarters in the US (7), France (4), Germany (3), UK (1), Denmark (1), Italy (1) and 
the Netherlands (1).  Out of the 22 interviews with Hungarian firms, 8 were state-owned while 
14 were privately owned businesses - out of which 2 were privatized incumbent firms, and 12 
domestic new entrants.  
Type of organization  Number of interviews 
MNE 25 
Domestic company 22 
Other experts from the context of the 
case 13 
Total number of interviews 60 
Total number of printed and online 
news articles and reports 71 
Table 3: Type of Organizations in Sample 
 
To limit bias in our interview data, we used different data collection approaches for 
increasing accuracy in retrospective research (Golden, 1992; Miller et al., 1997). We used 
secondary data to verify interviewees’ factual claims including information available on 
corporate websites, journalistic sources (including the Hungarian economic weekly HVG, 
Bloomberg.com, the Telegraph, Reuters.com, EurActiv, and The Economist), and reports by 
NGOs such as atlatszo.hu and Transparency International. 
Our interviews ranged from 45 to 90 minutes in duration. We carried out data collection 
and data analysis in parallel through an iterative process in order to develop our understanding 
of the processes and to reflect on the emerging findings. After the translation and transcription 
of interviews we analyzed the data by identifying initial concepts and grouping them into first-
order concepts (categories), relying on respondents’ quotes and terms. We used axial coding to 
create second-order concept by “refining and differentiating concepts” (Böhm, 2004: 271). At 
this stage, we drew on existing literature that has identified actions and characteristics of state- 
and authoritarian capitalism (see table 1, column 6). Finally, we gathered similar second-order 
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concepts into aggregate dimensions to build the basis of the framework that emerged. Once we 
had the draft aggregate dimensions we went back to our theoretical constructs and carried out 
an iteration process between our newly emerging framework based on our data and the theory 
(Gioia et al., 2012). We used NVivo 12 software for our data analysis to identify the four 
aggregates that represent four mechanisms of “authoritarianization” of capitalism. The 
empirical case study  allowed us to identify in “abductive” fashion - when data and existing 
theory are considered in tandem (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012) - the mechanisms that 
contribute to the country’s “backsliding” into authoritarian capitalism. 
 
Empirical Findings 
This section presents our empirical findings from the interviews with a view to deepen 
our understanding of “authoritarian capitalism”. We focus on the economic rather than the 
political sphere and analyze the mechanisms the Orbán Government used in bringing about the 
“authoritarianization” of capitalism. Our data shows that for the economy, “backsliding” has 
meant a dual shift in the boundary between the public and the private domains: Firstly, the state 
has once again become an active economic player who controls the economy and even 
competes with private actors; secondly, the state’s interests have become increasingly 
undistinguishable from the interests of the governing elite. We find evidence for four different 
mechanisms through which this has been achieved: 1. The creation of state dependence of 
private actors, 2. The reduction of economic pluralism to align economic actors’ interests with 
the political elite’s interests 3. The state being used as a tool to extract private rents, and 4. 
authoritarian shareholding (See Figure 1 that shows the data structure and Figure 2 that 
illustrates our conceptual framework of authoritarian capitalism).  
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Figure 1: Data Structure  
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Creating state-dependent economic actors 
The first mechanism of the “politicization of the economic” used by the Hungarian government 
consists in making economic actors increasingly dependent on the state for their survival. Four 
interrelated processes relate to this first mechanism: the centralization of state control over 
politics, the economy, and civil society; making private actors dependent on public contracts 
for income; changing – and restricting – the official channels of economic interest 
representation; and using laws and regulation with the sole purpose of creating dependence. In 
the following we will illustrate these processes through our interview quotes.   
Centralization of state control. Since 2010, Fidesz has used its control over parliament 
to ‘create a system based on the monopolization of the most important elements of political 
power’ (Bozóki, 2011: 650). We call this process the centralization of state control. The 
government introduced legal changes that centralized decision-making at various levels of the 
state bureaucracy (Hajnal and Rosta, 2014, Kornai, 2015). The increasing centralization of the 
state structure was accompanied by the appointment of people close to Fidesz to key state 
positions. This evolution considerably weakened the independence of state institutions, which 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework of Authoritarian Capitalism 
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previously played important roles in counterbalancing the government’s powers (Transparency 
International, 2012). Institutions affected by party-related appointments were the 
Constitutional Court, the prosecution, the institutions to safeguard the freedom of information, 
the State Audit Office, the bodies of election administration, the media authority, the Hungarian 
Competition Authority, the institutions of public procurement, the central bank, the 
ombudsman’s office as well as bodies subordinated to the government such as the police or the 
tax authority (Ligeti et al., 2019:12).  
Centralization of governmental control over the state bureaucracy also involved 
political appointments to key public positions. Thus, a former Fidesz member of the parliament 
has become President of the Media Authority, while the spouse of a prominent Fidesz Member 
of European Parliament (MEP) became Head of the National Judicial Office (Bozóki, 2011). 
The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction has been reduced substantially when the justices 
appointed by Fidesz–KDNP obtained a majority in the court in 2013 (Kovács, 2015: 273). 
Newly introduced legislation made it possible to dismiss public officials without cause, which 
in turn made “the cleansing of the entire government apparatus” possible (Bozóki 2011: 652). 
These changes violate if not the letter, so at least the spirit of the Civil Service Act of 1992, 
which “separated central policy from service delivery functions and clearly distinguished 
between political appointees and professional career employees” Negoita (2006: 225). Indeed, 
one key element of the rise of Orbán’s authoritarian capitalism in Hungary is the undermining 
of the previously – for post-socialist standards – exemplary technocratic and meritocratic 
bureaucracy (Negoita, 2006) and the separation of powers. The elimination of a meritocratic 
civil service and the worsening employment/retirement conditions of public servants (Hajnal 
and Rosta, 2014) have created an atmosphere in which public administrators became servile to 
the governing elite rather than wedded to professional standards. 
Our respondents’ perception of the declining autonomy of the state apparatus from 
Fidesz shows the impact of this trend on the economy. From the company’s perspective, the 
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main change implied that civil servants now act mainly following political and private interests, 
rather than public ones.  
“[P]ublic administrators are very much threatened – today they can be fired without a 
reason. It is not necessary [for Fidesz politicians] to even give them a mandate to do this 
or that, because they are so scared that they want to please politicians” (Respondent at 
Hungarian NGO01). 
Consequently, public sector career paths have dramatically changed. Instead of a 
meritocratic, long-term career progression, based on formal competences and experience, 
political loyalties and uncertainty now prevail: 
“I know somebody, who used to work for a ministry two years ago, and since then he 
cannot find a job. Just because he worked there at the time of the other government” 
(Respondent at Subsidiary17). 
The job insecurity for civil servants and demand for political loyalty is combined with 
an increasing centralization of decision-making in the hands of the inner circles of power. Even 
top-level civil servants and ministers’ decision-making abilities are limited, because many 
powers are concentrated in the Prime Minister’s (PM) hands. A respondent stated that: 
“I believe that today the power is in one hand – Orbán’s. Not even his ministers know which 
way to go. So, this adds to the uncertainty. People do not know what they can or cannot do. 
People cannot operate” (Respondent at Local15).   
Dependence through public contracts. Our interviews also suggest that the private 
sector has become increasingly dependent on income stemming from the state. Firms operating 
in different sectors explained that the state has become dominant as “a large customer” through 
“big investment projects,” making public contracts essential for survival, including in 
marketing, services, and construction (Subsidiary04; Local04). Respondents highlighted that 
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the state has become a “more and more dominant player in the economy” not only as a 
customer, but also in “distribution and in ownership” (Subsidiary04).  
Changing channels of economic interest representation. Centralization and 
powerlessness were also mentioned when respondents spoke about the changing channels of 
economic interest representation since 2010, which parallels the removal of opportunities for 
political opponents in Parliament to influence decision-making (Greskovits, 2015). Many 
argued that traditional interest groups such as chambers of commerce or industrial associations 
no longer have a voice in Hungary. Some even stated that they have “zero impact” as the 
government “does not listen at all” (Subsidiary01). Others, representing industry interests, cited 
examples of officials at Ministries who were not allowed to meet them until they got clearance 
from the top: “When the crisis tax was introduced a Secretary of State met us – in our role as 
representatives of the trade association - in the Ministry of Economy and he said to us that he 
had been ‘authorized’ to meet us” (Subsidiary08). This illustrates how centralization leads to 
reduced autonomy of public officials and a close central political control even over high-
ranking public official. 
 Respondents claimed that decision-makers at public bodies and state offices are 
powerless, as the final decisions depend on the PM’s approval: “There are 2-3 people that 
influence the Prime Minister, but even they do not make the decisions, ultimately the Prime 
Minister makes the decisions” (Subsidiary01). Some argued that there was somewhat more 
openness during the second government in 2014-18 when companies were more listened to, 
although “not heard” (Subsidiary02) as there were no “public consultations before legislative 
changes” (Subsidiary08). To bypass economic actors, the Orbán administration 
institutionalized a hitherto rarely used process in political decision-making: proposing 
legislation through member of parliament’s (MP) motions. The majority of proposals submitted 
to the Parliament in 2010 were MP’s motions (Transparency International, 2012). When a 
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legislative proposal is introduced by individual MPs, no ministerial consultation procedures or 
the involvement of the government is required. In this environment businesses feel that “in 
Hungary it is not worth to represent interests, because today in the Parliament a ‘voting 
machine’ operates” (Local09). 
Authoritarian use of regulation. A further mechanism by which the Orbán government 
shifts the boundary between the public and private, is the authoritarian use of legislation by 
introducing laws and regulations that are purely aimed at creating dependence of economic 
actors on the state. The Orbán government has extensively used legal- and tax reforms to 
change the “playing field” in legal ways that many existing companies cannot cope with. Thus, 
various legal changes forced existing companies in different sectors out of business and paved 
the way for the entry of new, politically connected companies (cf. Kovács, 2015). Targeted 
sectors were mainly those focused on the domestic market in the services sector, because the 
government considered foreign investment in these areas “bad FDI” (Sass, 2017: 6). 
Given the formal legality of these types of state intervention, one could expect that 
companies can also use legal means to protect themselves through lawsuits or appeals to the 
courts. However, this is where the government’s respect of the RoL stops. Thus, an interviewee 
from a large Hungarian company described the situation where the company was owed money 
by a SOE and the state authorities intervened to settle the conflict: 
“I was ordered to go to the Ministry to see the Secretary of State […]. He was very rude 
and told me that whatever will happen he will sit in his chair for the next eight years and 
therefore he advises me not to push it, because obviously he will make me feel the weight 
of my decision […]. There were five people there […]”  (Respondent at Local10). 
This type of intimidating and arbitrary state intervention to prevent companies from 
using the legal means at their disposal has created a general apprehension among the business 
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elite of the state authorities who do not respect the principle of self-limitation of state power 
any longer: 
“Today, there is a fear from central authority in people’s blood; a fear that they can take 
away anything, do anything.” (Respondent at Local15).  
“You make decisions that you would not make in a stable environment. I give work to 
this person,…money to that person… Just leave me alone!… CEOs are kept in fear” 
(Respondent at Local15). 
This authoritarian use of law and regulation implies that formally legal intervention is backed 
up by pure threat and intimidation that violates the RoL. 
 
Reducing ‘Economic Pluralism’ to align economic actors’ interests with the governing elite’s 
interests 
 
Using legal and constitutional changes to reduce political pluralism is a hallmark technique 
used by authoritarian governments to increase their power (Müller, 2017). An equivalent 
process is applied to the economic sphere to reduce “economic pluralism” by creating an 
economic elite whose interests are aligned with the political elite. Indeed, the Orbán 
government has used the state apparatus to transfer state- and private assets to supportive actors, 
while eliminating others; creating thus a new economic elite and aligning the economic and 
political elite’s interests.  
Creating a new elite. The reshaping of the retail sector provides an example of how the 
government redistributes state assets to create a new elite. A “special tax” was introduced in 
2010 with a retroactive effect. The tax required all retailers operating in Hungary with annual 
revenue over 500m HUF (ca. $2.2m) to pay a special tax on their consolidated revenues. In 
February 2014 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the special retail tax puts 
companies from other EU member states at a competitive disadvantage as many of the largest 
retail groups who were exposed to the highest rate were foreign companies, while the Hungarian 
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retailers were smaller companies paying a much lower rate (Gulyas, 2014). In reaction to the 
ruling, in December 2015, the parliament passed a series of laws that directly targeted 
international retail chains operating in Hungary, requiring non-family-owned retailers of a 
certain size to remain closed on Sundays, and stores to close if they reported losses for two 
consecutive years. The combination of these rules put multinational corporations at a 
disadvantage compared to Hungarian competitors (Kovacs, 2013). According to our 
interviewees, the goal of these changes was to reshape the ownership of firms in key 
domestically orientated sectors in favor of Hungarian owners: 
“Sectoral taxes, financial crisis tax, legislation on Sunday opening times, they 
all served the goal to bring into position Hungarian chains and force the change 
of ownership in the sector. This has not happened yet. We feel that this goal is 
still there, and we constantly have to pay attention to see how the government 
will try to force this change of ownership with legislative changes or other ways, 
so in this respect the role of the state is absolutely dominant.” (Respondent at 
Subsidiary07). 
The ruling political elite thus directly influences companies’ position in the market, 
restructures industries, and appoints or eliminates the dominant players in the Hungarian 
economy (Kovacs, 2015). These changes also had the more profound effect of reshaping the 
Hungarian economic elite, creating a group whose interests are directly aligned with the 
governing political elite.  
One interviewee stated: 
“As a result of this economic policy, a new oligarch circle has been created who took over a 
few sectors, like retail, media and construction.” (Respondent at Subsidiary15). 
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Creating dominant national champions. A related process of reshaping industries to reduce 
economic pluralism consists of creating a market dominated by chosen national champions 
while driving out foreign actors. One example is the 2013 re-regulation of the tobacco market. 
The cabinet introduced a law that guaranteed state monopoly for retail sales of tobacco products 
(Econews, 2012), withdrew all previously existing retail licenses, and distributed a more limited 
number, mostly to people close to prominent Fidesz members (Kovács, 2015). This step 
drastically disadvantaged major multinational tobacco companies and small family-owned 
retail shops. In December 2014, the government restricted the wholesale market, stipulating 
that the newly licensed retailers will only be permitted to purchase from state-owned wholesale 
corporations or those that the state contracted (Kovács, 2015: 287). Due to the monopolization 
of tobacco products, the number of retail outlets dropped sharply from 42,000 to 5,415 (Piac és 
Profit, 2013). It soon became clear that the new legislation originally was aimed to create a 
monopoly for Continental Zrt., a Fidesz-related tobacco manufacturer (Laki, 2015), whose 
employees and their family members have indeed won many of the new concessions (Nagy and 
Szabó, 2013). Investigatory journalists also claimed that the tobacco act was written on the 
computer of Continental’s CEO, a close friend of Fidesz’s party leader, who officially 
submitted the proposal to the Parliament (Laki, 2015). This case illustrates how the government 
re-nationalizes sectors temporarily by creating state monopolies through legal means before re-
privatizing them by reallocating property to its own supporters (Magyar, 2016), thus creating a 
new elite whose interests are aligned with the political elites’ interests. 
One of our respondents commented: 
“[T]hey are killing the economy with indirect tools, like tobacco legislation. They turn 
the retail trade of tobacco products into a state monopoly; and then they turn the retail of 
alcohol and lotto sales into a state monopoly as well. So, all private tobacco firms, alcohol 
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firms, and toto-lotto firms go bankrupt. This is how they create a market for their own 
economic empire” (Respondent at Local17).  
The tobacco case also illustrates the authoritarian nature of the process of creating state 
monopolies and national champions in the sense that the procedure to achieve this goal 
systematically violated the RoL. Thus, when the government introduced the monopolization of 
tobacco retail sales, amendments were introduced after the closing date for applications for 
retail licenses and the concession was awarded without an open tender process (OECD, 2016). 
Furthermore the 2015 Freedom of Information Act abolished the government obligation to 
share information and data used in the decision-making process (OECD, 2016). 
 
The state as an instrument for the pursuit of the governing elite interests 
Our theoretical framework implies that both state capitalism and authoritarian 
capitalism differ from regulatory capitalism in the sense that the state becomes an economic 
actor in its own right. Yet, the key difference between state capitalism and authoritarian 
capitalism is that in the former case the state has a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the 
governing elite’s interests and at least partially pursues public goals, while in the latter case the 
state is itself being colonized by the ruling elite’s interests (see table 1). Two concepts emerging 
from our data capture the state’s loss of autonomy vis-à-vis the private sphere directly, namely 
changes in the nature of corruption and the state becoming a competitor for private firms.  
 Institutionalized corruption. Our respondents consistently referred to changes in the 
nature of corruption under the Orbán government. Earlier studies have already shown that 
those who have top-level networks and money can exert influence in Hungary (Sallai, 2013), 
however our interviews show that - rather than petty corruption of lower level bureaucrats - 
corruption has become “institutionalized” since 2010. It now involves the state authorities 
directly, rather than individual public officials within them. One respondent stated: “They 
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threaten the company, by – for example – sending the tax office out for control. They can 
always find something. They can make your life hard if you do not cooperate. We want to 
live in this country, but if you want to live here, they can make your life a 
struggle“(Respondent at Local15). 
In other words, rather than the “bottom up” corruption of the early post-socialist period, in 
Hungary today a ‘top-down type of systemic corruption became dominant’ (Transparency 
International, 2018: 2) and institutionalized in the state bureaucracy (cf. Kang, 2002). 
This trend directly erodes the boundary between the public and the private domains, leading to 
the blurring of public and private interests. One interviewee stated: “The situation when the 
economic and political life is separated from each other and have a corrupt relationship – is 
over. This is not the case anymore. Today the two are the same. Nobody can enter this system” 
(Respondent at Local17). As a report of Transparency International put it: “Corruption is a tool 
in the hands of the holders of public power; it allows for the distribution of goods as a function 
of loyalty rather than performance. […] In the scope of high-level abuses mostly linked to the 
holders of public authority, corruption occurs not against the rules but through them” (Ligeti 
et al., 2019:12).  
The state as competitor. A second process related to this mechanism is the state 
becoming an economic competitor for private firms. Various interviewees argue that SOEs are 
increasingly supported by the government to gain an advantage over non-Fidesz affiliated 
private firms. Yet, while SOE competition is a feature of state capitalism too, under 
authoritarian capitalism, the state has become a tool for the elite controlling it. Thus: “In my 
view, it is not the state that competes with firms, but rather individuals who compete through 
the use of the state’s infrastructure.” (Respondent at Local10).  
 
Authoritarian shareholding 
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Contrary to Situ et al. (2018), our more restrictive conceptualization of authoritarian capitalism 
implies that shareholding by the state per se cannot be seen as a mechanism of authoritarian 
capitalism. It becomes part of the authoritarian capitalist repertoire only if the RoL is violated 
in the process of acquisition or when shareholdings are used in the pursuit of the governing 
elite’s own interests. We call this mechanism ‘authoritarian shareholding’. Based on the 
Hungarian case we identify two related concepts “predatory nationalizations” and “forced buy-
outs.” 
 Predatory nationalizations. After the initial wave of privatizations in the 
1990s, predatory nationalizations started in 2010 when the government also 
nationalized the private pillar of the mandatory pension system (Adam and 
Simonovits, 2017). The first company targeted by re-nationalization was MAL Zrt., 
one of the largest aluminum manufacturers in Hungary. When a red sludge reservoir 
burst and caused serious environmental damage and casualties (Dunai, 2010), the 
government took the opportunity to have Parliament nationalize MAL (Day, 2010). In 
2011, the government suspended state control over MAL, but the regional 
environmental agency imposed a HUF 135bn fine on the company (Mihályi, 2015).  
Renationalization measures were often helped by the authoritarian use of regulation 
discussed above and hit not just domestic firms. One interviewee at a foreign 
subsidiary stated:  
“They have made life so difficult and so expensive for the foreign-owned utilities 
companies that they forced them to sell out. Regulating gas and electricity retail 
prices down to loss making levels, instituting utility tax […]. You did not see a 
wave of Venezuela style nationalization, but measures were taken to seriously 
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reduce value of these companies and then they [could buy them up]. That’s what 
happened in the utilities and bank industries.” (Respondent at Subsidiary01). 
 
State-ownership expanded significantly in sectors such as energy, banking, public 
works, transportation, the media, and advertising (Kornai, 2015). Thus, in 2012 the government 
declared its plans to re-nationalize the gas sector by buying back E-On’s Hungarian gas 
business (Than, 2012). It also bought back 21.2 percent of the previously privatized national 
oil and gas corporation MOL from the Russian oil company Surgutneftegas (BBJ, 2012). By 
2016 energy retailing had become a government-owned monopoly as the state has bought 
private electricity and gas retailers through the state-owned Hungarian Development Bank 
(MFB) and the Hungarian Electricity Company (MVM). Through these transactions the state 
has bought subsidiaries of the German E.On and RWE and the French GDF and EDF (Kovács, 
2015).  
Some of the re-nationalizations were first initiated by the previous, Socialist-led 
government (Mihályi, 2015). However, under the Orbán government, these re-nationalizations 
changed in nature and increasingly became predatory. Indeed, (re)nationalizations are not 
necessarily illegitimate means of state intervention in the economy per se and may very well 
have a positive impact on economic development in some cases. Thus, in many state capitalist 
regimes governments can pick winners to promote growth (Evans, 1995). What makes the re-
nationalizations in Hungary part of authoritarian capitalism is that they are – despite the 
nationalistic anti-FDI rhetoric surrounding them and despite the government compensating the 
previous owners quite generously (Mihályi, 2015:1) – not part of a national developmental 
strategy, but rather a predatory one that serves the governing elite to extend their power over 
the economy and enrich its members. Evidence suggests that government officials have private 
interests in economic restructuring (Dunai, 2018) and many friends and family members have 
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become extremely rich since 2010 (Buckley and Byrne, 2017). For instance, the wealth of 
Lőrinc Meszáros – Orbán’s childhood friend and a gas fitter by profession - and Orbán’s son-
in-law István Tiborcz has grown exponentially in the last eight years. They acquired stakes in 
major industries like banking, energy, construction, agriculture and the media, as well as 
tourism (Dunai, 2018). In 2019 Meszáros was the second, while Tibrocz the 32th on the list of 
the richest people in Hungary (Blaskó, 2019).  
One respondent described the strategy in the following terms: 
“The government nationalized gas utility companies. […] So politically the 
message is very good: we have chased out profit-hungry foreign multinationals. 
They [the state] take over these utility services, then technological standards will 
erode, and the government will say we need to improve the technological quality, 
they will improve it from taxpayers’ money…oh no, before they start to improve, 
they will assign who will be the future buyers… their mates. Then they will sign 
the contract with them and afterwards the state will improve the technological 
quality of the companies for several billion forints and then these firms will be 
transferred into private hands close to the government. And then sooner or later they 
will try to sell them again to foreign multinationals.” (Respondent at Subsidiary11). 
 
 Forced buy-outs. A second aspect of the “authoritarian shareholding” mechanisms can 
be called forced buy-outs (FBOs). FBOs resemble what is known in the Russian case as illegal 
corporate raiding (reyderstvo) (Rochlitz, 2014), but is used in Hungary more actively by actors 
close to the government. Our respondents referred to many concrete cases of FBOs. Indeed, 
since 2010 “private property has become the target of frequent legal, economic and ideological 
attacks” (Kornai, 2015: 6). 
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Our interviews suggest that FBOs generally are carried out by Fidesz-related 
individuals approaching the owners of private companies and “persuading” them to transfer 
their ownership rights, often without payment. Our respondents claimed that when owners 
refuse to cooperate, the “raider” threatened the targeted firms with tax office investigations, no 
access to public contracts, or other negative consequences. Thus, one respondent related the 
following anecdote: 
 
“They buy up a lot of companies…They use mafia tools. They use the power of the state. 
[…] For example, I know of a media company, which made lamppost posters for parties 
during elections. They were always very careful to have 50-50 percent of Fidesz and 
MSZP on their posters. It is a private company. Some people went there and said, ‘we 
would like to have 50 percent of your company for free’. As the company did not want to 
‘sell’, after two months the same people went back and said, ‘we want 80 percent of the 
company’. Then - when the owners still did not sell - after two weeks they introduced a 
law that forbids political posters on city lampposts. Consequently, the market value of the 
firm went down to 10 percent [of its previous value]” (Respondent at Local07). 
This anecdote highlights how failure to cooperate with the government leads to legal 
“retaliation” by the state. Several other interviewees confirm that threat of government 
retaliation can be enough to make company owners give up their company (Local17; NGO02). 
Contrary to re-nationalizations, FBOs do not transfer ownership to the state, but directly to 
private individuals close to the governing elite. They are hence a sign of the deep penetration 
of the elite’s private interests into the state sphere – the second erosion of the public-private 
divide normally protected by the rule of law – and imply that the state has become itself an 
economic actor that serves the governing elite’s interests.  
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Discussion & Conclusion 
The concept of “authoritarian capitalism” has merit in that it expands the varieties of 
capitalism approach to include important emerging market economies (Hofman et al., 2017) 
and alerts us to types of state intervention in the economy that go beyond its role in the ideal-
typical Western regulatory state. Yet, in this article, we have shown that existing studies fail to 
provide a clear definition of the authoritarian nature of authoritarian capitalism. Often, they 
equate the Chinese reality with “authoritarianism,” or they consider any – even legal – state 
intervention in the economy to be authoritarian (Situ et al., 2018). This approach limits the 
usefulness of the concept. 
It is crucial for scholars to develop new conceptual tools to study the contexts of 
LMICs, whose realities often defy Western academic concepts and theories (Bothello et al., 
2019). “Authoritarian capitalism” can be such a concept if we define “authoritarian state 
intervention” as state action that infringes on key principles of the “Rule of Law.” This allows 
us to distinguish authoritarian capitalism from other types of state-permeated business systems 
– such as state capitalism. Furthermore, defining authoritarian capitalism as the erosion of the 
two boundaries between the public and the private and the focus on the mechanisms that allow 
the governing elite to shift that boundary captures the dynamic nature of the phenomenon, 
rather than conceiving of authoritarian capitalism as a stable state as suggested by VoC-related 
categories. 
We argue that all four mechanisms we identified – the creation of state dependence of 
economic actors, reducing economic pluralism to align the economic elite’s interests with the 
governing elite’s interests, the state being used for the pursuit of the governing elite’s interests, 
and authoritarian shareholding – can be considered as part of a truly “authoritarian capitalist” 
state’s arsenal in the sense that they all imply state action that disregards the principle of the 
RoL and are used to allow the governing elite to eliminate plurality of interests in the political 
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and economic spheres. As such, they constitute authoritarian capitalist tools in a narrower sense 
than what previous literature has suggested, which sees even perfectly legal and legitimate 
types of state intervention – such as the state exercising its ownership rights – as a sign of 
authoritarianism (cf. Situ et al., 2018). Defining “authoritarian capitalism” more narrowly, 
avoids confusion between interventionism and authoritarian interventionism.  
We also contribute to the literature and study of post-socialist transition by extending 
the increasingly widely used concept of “democratic backsliding” in the political sphere (e.g. 
Greskovits, 2015) into the economic sphere. The mechanisms we identify shift the boundary 
between the political and the economic and lead to more authoritarian forms of economic 
governance. As such, we complement the existing literature on the rise of political 
authoritarianism with its economic pendant. 
One open question concerns the relationship between the four mechanisms we identify. 
Our empirical analysis shows that some of them are closely related. One distinction that can be 
made is between mechanism that erode the first private-public divide (i.e. the boundary 
between the state and the economy) and those that affect more the second one (i.e. the boundary 
between state interests and elite interests) (see figure 1). While these trends took place in 
parallel and several mechanisms may contribute to both trends at once, the Hungarian case 
does suggest that the erosion of the state’s autonomy was a pre-condition for the state becoming 
more interventionist in the economy once it had been colonized. 
In terms of the boundary conditions of our study, as a single country case study, our 
research is limited regarding its generalizability across contexts. Moreover, given the 
sensitivity of the topic at hand and the political situation in Hungary, our firm sample may be 
subject to a self-selection bias. While we attempted to mitigate this bias, it is conceivable that 
certain sectors and companies perceive the state’s role in a more positive light (cf. Scheiring, 
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2019). This may be the case for instance in the export-orientated sectors. Future research should 
more systematically analyze such sectoral differences. 
Our discussion also suggests that in the case of ‘authoritarian capitalism,’ political 
authoritarianism is matched with economic authoritarianism. This should not be seen as a 
universal feature of authoritarianism though. Indeed, history provides numerous examples of 
countries where the political regime was authoritarian – in the sense of eliminating pluralism, 
suppressing the right to participate in politics and to contest government –, but adopted a non-
interventionist attitude towards the economy. Pinochet’s Chile may be the prime example of 
an authoritarian political regime co-existing with a liberal economic one. Authoritarian 
capitalism only designates situations where a political regime uses authoritarian interventionist 
mechanisms to extend the state’s control over the economy (shifting the first boundary). 
Distinguishing political authoritarianism from economic authoritarianism raises a further issue, 
i.e. does economic authoritarianism have to be capitalist? We think not. Although we do not 
have much empirical evidence, North Korea may be an example of both political and economic 
authoritarianism; but it can hardly be qualified as a case of authoritarian capitalism. Therefore, 
economic authoritarianism may come in different varieties. Conversely, state dominance over 
the economy and anti-business policies, do not necessarily imply that the fundamental logic of 
that economy stops being capitalist. Scheiring (2019) for instance sees current authoritarian 
trends in post-socialist countries as a reaction to these semi-peripheral countries’ insertion in 
the capitalist world economy. As such, they may be inherently linked to capitalism and indeed 
follow a capitalist logic of accumulation. The extent to which an economically authoritarian 
regime remains capitalist despite increasing state control over the economy may hence depend 
on its place in the world economy. Future research should investigate both the reasons why 
certain authoritarian political regimes do not become economically authoritarian and what 
determines that economically authoritarian regimes remain capitalist. 
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